Abstract-Congestion-dependent pricing is a form of traffic management that would ensure the efficient allocation of bandwidth between users and applications. As the unpredictability of congestion prices creates revenue uncertainty for network providers and cost uncertainty for users, it has been suggested that longer-term financial agreements such as forward contracts could be used to manage these risks. In a network managed by a single service provider, long-term forward contracts are beneficial for both the provider and the users. We investigate whether forward contracts would be adopted by multiple service providers in a future Internet with congestion-dependent pricing. We develop a novel game-theoretic model of a multi-provider communication network with two complementary segments. Service on the upstream segment is provided by a single Internet Service Provider (ISP) and priced dynamically to maximize profit, while several smaller ISPs sell connectivity on the downstream network segment, with the advance possibility of entering into forward contracts with their users for some or all of their capacity. We show that the equilibrium forward contracting levels are necessarily asymmetric, with one downstream provider entering into fewer forward contracts than the other competitors, thus ensuring a high subsequent downstream price level. In practice, network providers will choose the extent of forward contracting strategically based not only on their risk tolerance, but also on the market structure in the interprovider network and their peers' actions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pricing for Internet service is currently based on access bandwidth and usage. However, with the growing diversity of applications using the Internet, there is considerable interest in designing a future Internet architecture that would allow users to indicate the value they place on network service by purchasing end-to-end Quality of Service (QoS) from the service provider.
Congestion-dependent pricing for communication networks has been proposed as a method of traffic management that can efficiently allocate bandwidth among users -e.g. households, small businesses, large service providers -who place different value on their applications, ensuring that users have an incentive to control congestion (for example, see [1] - [5] ).
To provide more predictable prices to service providers and users in a network with congestion pricing, longer-term financial contracts could be used. The purchase of forward contracts by the network users is proposed by Anderson et al. as a "Contract and Balancing Mechanism" [6] , which is shown to give users an incentive to control congestion, while avoiding the network provider's perverse incentive to cause congestion. On the other hand, Yuksel et al. [7] propose a "contractswitched" Internet, featuring a dynamic inter-provider pricing system to provide end-to-end QoS, in conjunction with longerterm financial contracts used for risk management.
In this paper, we ask whether long-term forward contracts would be offered to users in a future Internet with a dynamic inter-provider pricing system. Our analysis differs from the above papers by considering the fraction of a provider's capacity to be funded by long-term contracts as a strategic variable.
To study the interactions between multiple network providers in a tractable setting, we develop a two-stage model of bandwidth sold on two complementary segments of a multiprovider communication network by means of dynamic pricing (a spot market). Specifically, the upstream segment is provided by a single large Internet Service Provider, and the downstream segment is provided by several smaller ISPs. The upstream ISP connects the downstream ISPs to the Internet backbone. 1 In the first stage, the downstream ISPs choose the capacity to sell using forward contracts. In the second stage, all the ISPs set prices to maximize their respective revenue. Customers must purchase the same amount of bandwidth upstream and downstream in order to use the network services. We assume this high level of concentration because the provision of bandwidth exhibits significant economies of scale, and it is unlikely that perfect competition is sustainable in the long run. 2 This paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe a novel extension of the Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing game to model the interaction between the upstream ISP and the capacity-constrained downstream ISPs competing in prices with each other. We show in section III that, for sufficiently low market potential, downstream prices are competed down to marginal cost, while for sufficiently high market potential, there may be multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes, with different divisions of the total industry profit between the upstream and downstream providers. We assume the large upstream ISP has all the bargaining power and can choose which equilibrium will arise. In the region of intermediate market potential, we find an equilibrium point using mixed strategies for the downstream ISPs (section IV). With uncertain future demand for network service, providers have an incentive to enter into forward contracts in the first stage. However, the extent of forward contracting changes the dynamic price outcome in the second stage. In section V we use the pricing analysis to investigate the downstream ISPs' incentives for using forward contracts to fund their bandwidth. We find that a downstream ISP choosing a low level of contracting is able to raise the general downstream price level, allowing its competitors to contract more. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of contracting levels, if it exists, must have a unique lowest level of contracting. We further prove that an increase in this lowest level has a negative marginal externality 3 on other downstream ISPs' utility, whereas an increase in any other contracting level creates positive marginal externalities. In section VI, we present conclusions. In order to aid readability, we have relegated the more technical aspects of the proofs of the first two theorems to three lemmas, which we have proved in [9] .
II. PRICING MODEL
We consider the two-stage contracting and pricing game played by n+1 firms supplying bandwidth on two perfectly complementary network segments: an upstream ISP (acting as a monopoly), denoted UISP, supplying one segment; and n downstream ISPs (an oligopoly), denoted ISP 1 , ISP 2 , . . . , ISP n , n ≥ 1, supplying the other segment. In the first stage, the ISP i simultaneously choose to sell capacities 0 ≤ f i ≤ k by means of forward contracts, to hedge against demand uncertainty. (The first-stage contracting game is discussed further in section V.) Demand for bandwidth is random and revealed between the two stages of the game. In the second stage, the providers UISP and ISP 1 , ISP 2 ,. . . , ISP n simultaneously set prices p U and p 1 , p 2 ,. . . , p n , respectively.
We model the second-stage behavior of the downstream ISPs as "Bertrand-Edgeworth" price competition with capacity constraints, first studied by Edgeworth who showed that the duopoly case might not have an equilibrium in prices [10] . The formulation of the problem with the "rationing rule" considered here is due to Levitan and Shubik [11] . They found that prices are competed down to the perfectly competitive level equal to marginal cost when demand is low; and there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, a pair of prices such that neither firm can increase its profit by unilaterally changing its price, coinciding with the Cournot quantity strategy equilibrium when demand is high. For the intermediate region of demand, they derived a Nash equilibrium in mixed (random) strategies. Vives [12] established the mixed-strategy equilibrium for the general case of oligopoly with more than two competitors and proved convergence to the perfectly competitive price as the number of firms increases. We extend this model to the case where the oligopolists have previously sold forward contracts for diverse fractions of their bandwidth capacities and allow for price interaction with UISP.
We assume that UISP is a large provider connecting the ISP i to the Internet backbone and has all the bargaining power. Thus, where the second-stage pricing game has multiple equilibria, the equilibrium with largest p U arises. In the special case of n = 1, ISP 1 is another monopolist and our game describes a bilateral monopoly.
On the other hand, where the pricing game has no purestrategy Nash equilibrium and prices fluctuate, a realistic analysis needs to take into account the timescales over which providers are likely to adjust their prices. This in turn depends on the technologies used for price updates. While the downstream providers can directly broadcast their prices to local users connected to their networks every few seconds, this approach does not scale to a large multi-provider network such as the Internet. The monopolistic transit provider is more likely to make use of a general pricing system. A natural suggestion for implementing inter-provider pricing by including a price path attribute in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) (defined in [13] , [14] ) has been made by [15] . This system would propagate price changes over the BGP convergence timescale of several minutes. For this reason, we assume that the downstream ISPs' prices are updated on a shorter timescale than the upstream ISP's price, and we model the downstream ISPs' behavior by mixed strategies and the upstream ISP's behavior by a pure strategy.
The bandwidth demand D U on the upstream ISP's network is the sum of the bandwidth demands D i served by each ISP i on the complementary network segment, i.e.,
We assume the costs of building the firms' infrastructure are sunk, and zero marginal costs are incurred during operation of the network. This is a good approximation for Internet provision. On the other hand, any constant marginal costs can be normalized to zero by redefining the prices, provided the marginal costs incurred by the competing downstream ISPs are equal. Let the upstream ISP's payoff be
Suppose each ISP i has previously sold capacity f i by means of forward contracts, so his (second-stage) payoff is
We assume a linear market demand function for simplicity, as used by [11] ,
rationed by capacity constraints of k on each ISP i . The downstream ISPs' incentives for choosing their contracting levels f i under demand uncertainty are to be discussed in section V. For the first-stage pricing model, we suppose simply that the market potential α and the price sensitivity β are given non-negative constants, and the contracting levels are given constants with 0 ≤ f i < k for some k.
Assume the upstream ISP is not subject to any capacity constraint, other than the total capacity nk resulting from the capacity of the complementary network segment. We consider the rationing rule maximizing consumer surplus and chosen by [11] , [16] : demand fills the cheapest downstream ISPs' capacities first and there is no income effect 5 on bandwidth consumption.
Formally, the bandwidth D i provided by ISP i and the total bandwidth provided by the upstream (and downstream) network D U are defined by the following conditions. The bandwidth provided by ISP i must satisfy the capacity constraint
the capacity of ISP i must be exhausted if market demand at price p i exceeds the total bandwidth used in the network
the bandwidth provided by ISP i must be zero if market demand at price p i is less than the total bandwidth used in the network
and, finally, demand splits equally between ISPs choosing the same price
In the rest of this paper, we shall assume without loss of generality that the ISP i are ordered by their contracting levels as
III. PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
The equilibrium outcome of the pricing game depends on the available bandwidth capacity compared to the market potential α. The following definition divides the set of possible levels of market potential into three regions.
and that market potential is f -intermediate if
As we will now show, in the region of f 1 -high market potential network capacity is exhausted. Thus, the total upstream and downstream price p 1 + p U is the congestion price, the lowest price at which demand can be satisfied. In the region of f 1 -low market potential, competition forces the downstream market price p 1 down to marginal cost, which is normalized to zero. In the region of f 1 -intermediate market potential, oscillatory price behavior follows, as will be explored in the next section. The following theorem characterizes the purestrategy Nash equilibria in the three regions.
Theorem 1. Pure-strategy equilibria are characterized as follows:
(i) If market potential is f 1 -high in the pricing game, then there is a range of pure-strategy equilibria given by
moreover, any f 1 -high pure-strategy equilibrium is of this form. 
there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium given by
If market potential is f 1 -intermediate and n ≥ 2, then there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.
Some observations may be in order. To begin, note that the general form of the result only differs between the bilateral monopoly (n = 1) and the true downstream oligopoly case (n ≥ 2) when market potential is f 1 -intermediate and competition results in the non-existence of any pure-strategy equilibrium. However, the boundaries between the regions depend on the number n of downstream firms. In the bilateral monopoly case, for example, the equilibrium with
In the absence of competition to force the downstream price to zero, this will only happen when market potential is so low that, given the contracting level f 1 , provider ISP 1 cannot obtain a positive profit by setting p 1 > 0.
Observe that none of the results stated in Theorem 1 depend on the contracting levels f 2 , . . . , f n , but only on the lowest contracting level f 1 . In general, any contracting weakens a downstream provider's incentive to set a high price in the pricing game, and the provider with the lowest contracting level, ISP 1 , will have the strongest incentive to do so. Under our assumptions, including the condition that UISP holds all the bargaining power and, when market potential is f 1 -high, the equilibrium with the highest p U arises, the equilibrium price levels are determined by ISP 1 and UISP, the other downstream ISPs being able to follow ISP 1 's price p 1 .
Proof of Theorem 1: We first show that the prices specified for f 1 -high and f 1 -low market potential are in equilibrium. We next prove two non-existence results in the regions where market potential is not f 1 -high and not f 1 -low, respectively, allowing us to deduce the unique characterization of the stated pure-strategy equilibria in the extremal regions and non-existence for f 1 -intermediate market potential. Special attention is paid to the case of bilateral monopoly n = 1.
If market potential is f 1 -high, this allows the choice of p 1 , p U satisfying the outlined conditions. We verify that these choices of prices do indeed constitute a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Here, UISP serves a market of maximal size nk, and he can do no better by cutting his price. The effect on UISP's profit of a rise in p U is
at the chosen point as well as for any higher value of p U . Therefore, UISP has no incentive to change his strategy. Firm ISP 1 's profit, on the other hand, is
Since the market share α−β(p U +p 1 )−(n−1)k is equal to k at our chosen point, and f 1 ≤ k, it follows that ISP 1 cannot gain by cutting his price. Here ISP 1 cannot increase his profit by raising his price either. We have shown that the chosen point is indeed a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. If market potential is f 1 -low, consider the set of strategies
The price p U is clearly UISP's best response to the zero strategy played by the ISP i : it is the monopolistic price. Observe that the total market served is
Therefore, if ISP i were to choose any other price p i > 0, his profit would be negative. We have established that this set of strategies is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
The unique characterization for the previous two equilibria follows from the following lemma, proved in [9] .
. . , p n ) be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices.
(i) Suppose market potential is not f 1 -low. Then there exists
When market potential is f 1 -high, consider any pure-strategy equilibrium given by the tuple of prices (p U ; p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ). We will show that the equilibrium satisfies (8) to (11) . Let i be such that p i D i > 0 with p i maximal. Suppose there was some j such that p j > p i . Then we would have D j = 0 by the definition of i, so ISP j would have an incentive to set p j equal to p i . Suppose now that there was some j such that p j < p i . It follows from (2-3) that D j = k and ISP j would be able to set any p j < p i while retaining a market share of k. Since f j < k, he would increase his profit by doing so. Therefore, we have shown that all prices are equal in our equilibrium (8) .
Suppose we had D 1 < k. Then ISP 1 would be able to increase his market share to k by cutting his price by any small amount. Hence we must have D 1 = k at equilibrium and the total market served is nk (9) .
Our previous argument shows that (10) and (11) must hold at equilibrium, so the ISP 1 and UISP respectively have no incentive to increase their price. We have therefore shown that every non-trivial pure-strategy equilibrium is of the given form.
If market potential is f 1 -low, n ≥ 2, Lemma 1 shows that every ISP i has p i D i = 0. If market potential is f 1 -low and n = 1, it is easy to see that the unique pure-strategy equilibrium is given by
Lemma 1 shows that there can be no pure-strategy equilibrium if market potential is f 1 -intermediate and n ≥ 2. Finally, if market potential is f 1 -intermediate and n = 1, it is easy to see that the unique pure-strategy equilibrium is given by (12) . This completes the proof of the theorem.
IV. MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
From Theorem 1, we know that for f 1 -intermediate market potential there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when the downstream market is a true oligopoly (n ≥ 2). Since the downstream ISPs set their prices on a shorter timescale than the upstream ISP, we assume they use mixed strategies, interpreted as distributions of fluctuating prices following [11] . The pricing game can be shown to have an equilibrium point. Local optimality of the upstream equilibrium price p U means that the UISP has no incentive to make small-scale deviations. The question of global optimality of p U is of little importance, since the other ISPs can in any case not be expected to maintain their strategies if UISP makes large-scale deviations. 6 However, an interesting question that remains is whether allowing UISP to play a mixed strategy leads to a different equilibrium point. We will consider this in Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 2:
The proof of this theorem makes use of a generalization of the solution of the BertrandEdgeworth oligopoly in [11] , [12] , taking forward contracting into account.
Preliminaries: Reduced Pricing Game: We start by considering the reduced pricing game arising between the ISP i if UISP has precommitted to a fixed price p U . In analogy with Definition 1, the following regions turn out to be useful.
and that market potential is (f,
The form of the equilibrium depends on the level of market potential [9] .
Lemma 2. The reduced pricing game has the following Nash equilibria.
( 
(ii) If market potential is (f 1 , p U )-low, then there is a purestrategy equilibrium, in which each ISP i names almost surely
In every pure-strategy equilibrium,
reduced pricing game has the following unique mixedstrategy equilibrium. Let 
and ISP i 's expected payoff over every mixed strategy p j is 
Existence: We now prove existence of the equilibrium point. Let p U be such that
It follows that
Let {p i } i be the mixed-strategy equilibrium of Lemma 2. Then the mixed strategy p i maximizes ISP i 's profit. To prove our theorem, we just need to show that UISP's expected profit is at a local maximum at some p U in this range.
First, suppose that βp
and UISP's expected profit is
which is locally maximized by p U if and only if
At the upper bound of the allowed range for p U , if βp U = kn < α 2 , then
At the lower bound of the allowed range, if βp
Since Ep max is continuous in p U , the Intermediate Value Theorem shows that there exists a value p * U ∈ k(n−1), min kn, α 2 such that (27) holds. On the other hand, at the lower bound βp U = α − k(n + 1) + f 1 ≥ k(n − 1) the mixed-strategy equilibrium of p i turns out to be the pure-strategy equilibrium given by Uniqueness: To prove that there is only one equilibrium point with the given properties, we first need a technical lemma from [9] on the variation with the constant price p U of the expected maximum price named by an ISP i . . . , p n are pure strategies. It is easy to see that the price p U must in fact be a globally optimal strategy for UISP, so the equilibrium point is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This contradicts Theorem 1, so we have proved that market potential is (f 1 , p U )-intermediate in any equilibrium point with the stated properties.
Lemma 3. Suppose market potential is f 1 -intermediate. Let the expected maximum downstream price be Ep
Consider the function
At any equilibrium point satisfying our assumptions, we have f (p U ) = 0. We have already shown the existence of such a point p U = p (1) U . It follows from Lemma 2 that f is continuously differentiable. By Lemma 3
Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists p
with the same properties. Without loss of generality p
U . It follows from the sign of the derivative of f that we can find 0
Since f is a continuous function, the Intermediate Value Theorem gives p
Inductively, we obtain an infinite sequence p
By the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem, this sequence must have an accumulation point p U . Clearly then f (p U ) = 0 and f (p U ) = 0, which contradicts Lemma 3. We have therefore established uniqueness of UISP's equilibrium price p (1) U . By Lemma 2, the equilibrium point is unique.
One remaining question is whether allowing the upstream ISP to play any mixed strategy gives rise to a different equilibrium. It turns out that this is not the case for mixedstrategy Nash equilibria where bandwidth demand can be served completely and is sufficient to fill all but one downstream ISPs' networks almost surely.
Theorem 3. Let market potential be f 1 -intermediate. Suppose there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the pricing game such that almost surely
Then p U is a pure strategy and the equilibrium is the equilibrium point given in Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Consider a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Suppose that almost surely
Let
But (30) must still hold almost surely if UISP plays any pure strategy
For any such pure strategy, UISP's expected profit is
This is a quadratic function with a unique maximum on the domain p U ∈ [p U , p U ]. Therefore, UISP plays a pure strategy.
Given the forward contracts entered into by the downstream providers, we have thus completely characterized the ISPs' pricing behavior. In general, the size of the market potential relative to the available capacity determines whether the game has a pure or mixed-strategy equilibrium.
When market potential is low, there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with downstream prices equal to zero or marginal cost. The downstream ISPs compete the price down in this case, or, for a single downstream firm operating as part of a bilateral monopoly, the capacity sold by forward contracts absorbs all demand.
When market potential is high, there is a range of purestrategy Nash equilibria with different divisions of the same total network price between the upstream and downstream industries. Bandwidth demand attains the level of available capacity and the total price is the congestion price, representing the value of a marginal unit of capacity. The balance of bargaining power between the firms determines which equilibrium arises. When the upstream ISP has all the bargaining power, the fraction of the total income obtained by the downstream industry is a decreasing function of the lowest level of contracting f 1 , but is independent of all other levels of contracting.
For intermediate market potential, there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium only in the case of a bilateral monopoly (and capacity is not exhausted in this case). For a downstream oligopoly (n ≥ 2), there exists an equilibrium point consisting of optimal mixed strategies for each downstream ISP and a locally optimal pure strategy for the upstream ISP.
Despite the different pricing outcome in the two non-trivial cases of intermediate and high market potential, the next section shows that the incentives for forward contracting can be analyzed in a uniform way over both regions.
V. FORWARD CONTRACTING
We now consider the first stage of the two-stage game described in section II. Thus, having analyzed the secondstage pricing subgame in sections II through IV, by backward induction we can turn our attention to the first stage choice of forward contracting. In particular, we will analyze the network providers' choice of contracting under uncertain bandwidth demand. We will establish that the equilibrium contracting levels are always asymmetric, with one provider choosing the unique lowest contracting level, before deriving the form of the externalities within the oligopoly that are due to the choice of contracting levels in equilibrium. The results of the previous sections show that the lowest contracting level is an important factor in determining second-stage prices. In the case of the pure-strategy equilibrium outcome, the lowest contracting level is the only contracting level that determines the second-stage outcome. As the smallest contracting level increases, downstream prices decline, hurting all downstream providers. However, the firm with the smallest contracting level is clearly subject to more price risk than the other providers.
Before we begin, we make one natural assumption. Suppose the parameter β describing the bandwidth market's price sensitivity is random. In the first stage, the ISP i simultaneously choose to sell capacities 0 ≤ f i ≤ k by means of forward contracts. When some f i = k, we assume the outcome of the second-stage pricing game is the continuous extension of the pure-strategy equilibrium of Theorem 1 or the equilibrium of Theorem 2, as appropriate. 7 Now, to begin. Between the two stages, the true value of β, the price sensitivity, is revealed. Assume ISP i has the mixed pricing strategy p i in the second stage and can sell forward contracts for bandwidth over its network segment at the riskneutral expected price, obtaining first-stage income from the contracts of
where E p denotes expectation over the ISPs' mixed pricing strategies and E β denotes expectation over the random parameter β.
If ISP i is risk-averse with a utility function U that is increasing and strictly concave, its total payoff is
Firm UISP's payoff is
In general, we do not know whether there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the first-stage choice of contracting levels. However, any such equilibrium must satisfy the following result. ( 
Then the lowest contracting level is unique, i.e.,
When market potential is not 0-low, any contracting equilibrium where the downstream ISPs obtain positive payoffs must be asymmetric. In the special case of 0-high market potential, it is easy to show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of contracting levels exists and all but one contracting levels are maximal f 2 = f 3 = · · · = f n = k in equilibrium. A riskaverse provider would seek to set a high contracting level as insurance against price risk, hoping that some other provider will choose a low contracting level and thereby raise the downstream second-stage price level. Although no provider would want to be the one choosing the lowest contracting level, such a provider may arise naturally in practice, for example, due to asymmetries in information, risk aversion, or timing. Nevertheless, the lack of symmetric equilibrium may be a source of uncertainty for network providers considering investment into bandwidth.
Proof of Theorem 4: Clearly market potential is not f 1 -low, since ISP 1 can achieve a positive profit by choosing a sufficiently low contracting level f 1 > 0, subject to market potential not being 0-low.
Suppose first that market potential is f 1 -high. The secondstage subgame has a pure-strategy equilibrium, which is independent of f j , for j ≥ 1. Since ISP j , j > 1, is strictly riskaverse, he has an incentive to choose f j > f 1 .
Suppose that market potential is f 1 -intermediate instead. Suppose, for a contradiction, that f 2 = f 1 . We will show that, if ISP 1 has no incentive to choose a lower contracting level, then he must have an incentive to choose a higher one. For each β, ISP 1 's profit varies with f 1 = f 2 according to
where
It is easy to check that
This gives
The right-hand side must be non-negative since ISP 1 has no incentive to decrease his contracting level. Hence the left-hand side is positive, and ISP 1 can increase his expected utility by raising his contracting level slightly. This is a contradiction, so f 2 = f 1 as required. We now quantify the impact of one downstream provider's choice of contracting level on its competitors' utility. Choosing a low level of contracting f 1 is like providing a "public good" 8 to the oligopoly, by raising the general price level, but doing so is privately costly to ISP 1 , as it implies a low level of insurance against demand uncertainty. In the case of f 1 -intermediate market potential, the choices of the contracting levels f 2 , . . . , f n result in externalities with the opposite sign, so greater levels of contracting benefit other ISPs. The presence of externalities means that downstream providers have an incentive to coordinate their actions by collusion. In this case, there is a particular incentive for a provider to make side-payments to a competitor in return for this provider agreeing to refrain from entering into forward contracts.
Theorem 5. Suppose
Proof of Theorem 5: If market potential is f 1 -high, every ISP i charges price 
It is easy to show that dp * 0
∂pU < 0 and dp * U dfi > 0. Hence dp * 0 dfi > 0. On the other hand, ∂p0 ∂f1 < 0 and dp * U dfi > 0, so dp * 0 df1 < 0.
It is also easy to show that
In particular, when 1 < i = j, ∂Epj ∂fi ≥ 0 and ∂Epj ∂pU < 0, so we have
Since ISP j 's profit is the stochastic quantity I j + π j where
, the result follows immediately.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article started with the observation that a dynamic pricing system for the Internet would ensure a more efficient allocation of resources. However, both providers and users would be exposed to substantial risk due to rapidly changing prices in such a system. Longer-term contracts between providers and users could help mitigate this risk. In a communication network operated by a single provider, it is clear that entering into long-term forward contracts with the network users is in the provider's interest. The situation is more complex in a multi-provider network.
In this paper, we have analyzed the incentives for forward contracting by ISPs competing to supply bandwidth on a downstream network segment, when a single ISP with significant market power supplies bandwidth on a complementary upstream network segment. In order to determine the incentives for contracting, we have first studied the subsequent pricing equilibrium which arises in different contracting scenarios. Depending on the level of market potential compared with the available bandwidth capacity, the pricing outcome can be characterized as an equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies.
We can draw some conclusions on the choice of forward contracts over two stages assuming the market's pricesensitivity is random and the downstream firms are risk-averse. Provided that market potential is not so low that downstream prices are competed down to zero, we prove that any purestrategy Nash equilibrium of positive contracting levels must be asymmetric and have a unique lowest contracting level. This gives rise to a version of the game of "Chicken": as the provider who chooses this lowest contracting level is exposed to more price uncertainty than the other competitors, no selfish risk-averse provider would want to be the one choosing the lowest equilibrium contracting level. Nevertheless, if a provider believes that every competitor will choose a high level of forward contracting, then he does have an incentive to choose a low level. In practice, this instability may discourage investment into bandwidth. The reason is that forward contracts have a negative impact on a provider's strategic incentives during the pricing stage. A strategy available to network providers that eliminates this effect is vertical integration with the upstream provider. Alternatively, a natural lowcontracting provider may arise in the presence of asymmetries, for example, in risk aversion or timing.
We further prove that the choice of contracting levels causes externalities. An increase in the lowest contracting level has a negative marginal externality on other downstream ISPs. An increase in any other contracting level has no externality for high market potential, but a positive marginal externality for intermediate market potential. In this sense, we can think of the downstream ISP with the least forward contracting as providing a public good to the oligopoly. A consequence is an incentive for providers to collude on contracting choice. An agreement of mutual benefit to two providers might specify that a high-contracting provider makes side payments to a low-contracting provider in exchange for the latter choosing a lower level of contracting than would be privately optimal.
Finally, while our model was developed for a wholesale bandwidth market, it can more generally be seen as an abstract economic model, with conclusions applicable to the pricing of complementary goods where firms sell part of their capacities by forward contracting.
A possibility for further research would be to consider interactions between ISPs linked by other network shapes.
